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Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is an emerging wireless object identification technology with many 
potential applications such as supply chain management, personnel tracking and healthcare. However, security 
vulnerabilities of the RFID system have been a serious concern for its wide adoption in many applications. 
Although there are lots of work to provide privacy and anonymity, little focus has been given to ensure 
confidentiality and integrity of RFID tag data. To this end, we propose a lightweight hybrid approach based on 
stenographic and watermarking to ensure data confidentiality, linkability resistance and integrity on the RFID tags 
data. The proposed technique is capable of tampered data recovering and restoring for RFID tag. It has been 
validated and tested on EPC class 1 gen2 tags.  
Keywords: RFID, Tag data confidentiality and integrity, Stenography, Tampered data recovery, Linkability 
resistance. 
1. Introduction 
RFID is gaining attention as the core next generation 
object identification technology. With various strengths 
such as recognition speed, high identification rates and 
non-line of sight operation, RFID system has become 
very popular in many domains such as supply chain 
management, curb counterfeit, healthcare, etc. RFID 
differs from existing identification technologies such as 
barcode in that it can identify individual tags and has 
memory to store data. Generally, RFID system is 
composed of a set of tags, one or more readers and a 
back-end database server.  RFID tags are generally  
 
classified as passive, active and semi-active. Passive 
tags are low cost and have little storage and 
computation capabilities and obtain power from the 
reader. In contrast, active tags have their own power 
source and more costly than the passive and semi-active 
tags.  
The passive tags are cheaper and more popular than 
other type of tags. This paper will focus on passive tags 
only. The communication channel between the tag and 
the reader is over wireless radio frequency (RF). RFID 
tags store sensitive information which is pertinent to 
only a specific object only. The tag might contain 
different information sets based on its implication. 
Commonly, a tag might contain a product code, object 
class, patient identification code, credit card 
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information, passport number, etc. The tag is 
interrogated by the RFID reader when it gets in the 
readers reading vicinity and provides information stored 
on the tag to the reader. RFID tag can be 
“promiscuous”, that is, it will communicate with any 
reader.  Although RFID tag contains a very small 
amount of information, this information might be 
sufficient to take unfair advantage by competitors. 
Exposing part or all of the information stored in the tag 
could pose serious risk to individuals and business. 
At present, one of the main issues with RFID 
technology is secure and scalable deployment. Within 
the security umbrella, there are several open issues such 
as confidentiality, tampering, tampered data recovery, 
etc.  
Tag data confidentiality ensures that an illegitimate 
entity cannot use intercepted information for malicious 
or illegitimate activities and take business advantages 
using linkability property. Linkability is a property 
where intercepted/accrued data can be matched to draw 
some useful information. Ensuring confidentiality 
increases trust and reliability in the supply chain 
between partners. Linkability resistance discourages 
ransoms, illegal business advantage, etc.  
Tampering is a critical threat which consists in the 
malicious changing of data recorded in tag memory. A 
tampered tag in supply chain becomes useless because it 
cannot convey reliable information. [1] 
The EPC Manager (EM) and Object Class (OC) are 
very sensitive data which require confidentiality to 
increase trust and linkability resistance. None of the 
existing work addressed the issue. There are a number 
of existing techniques exist to ensure tamper detection 
and resistance. However, only one of them attempt on 
tampered data recovering and restoring which cannot 
detect or recover a tampered serial number of a tag.  
In this paper we are proposing a hybrid technique 
which combined stenographic based technique 
(StenoCipher) and watermarking technique to ensure 
following: 
• Confidentiality and randomness of tag’s 
sensitive data such as EM and OC. 
• Ensure linkability resistance of tag’s sensitive 
data such as EM and OC. 
• Tamper detection and restoring for EM, OC and 
serial number. 
In section 2, we survey the existing literature on 
RFID security. In section 3, we formalize the problem 
description. In section 4, we propose the confidentiality, 
linkability resistance, tamper detection and recovery 
solution. In section 5, we provide a discussion of 
proposed scheme’s applicability, presented comparative 
study and conclude the paper in section 6. 
2. RFID Security Issues and Related Work 
The main aim of this section is to discuss the security 
issue in RFID systems and survey the relevant literature.  
2.1. Tag data format 
To clearly understand various security issues related to 
tag data, we have to have an established and clear 
discussion of tag data and its format. The EPC tag 
format is shown in Fig 1. The tag data format shown in 
Figure 1 is a General Identifier (GID-96) 96-bit EPC tag 
format, helps an application to identify an object. The 
EPCglobal Gen 2 tag encodes a header field, EPC 
manager, object class and serial number. [2] 
 
      8 bits              28 bits                 24 bits           36 bits 
Fig. 1. EPC-96 bits Tag data format 
The header field defines the overall length and 
format of the values of tag fields. The EPC manager 
identifies the company associated with the EPC. The 
object class number refers to the exact type of product 
being identified. The serial number field identifies the 
serial number of the product itself. There are two 
different sizes of Tag: the 64-bit scheme and the 96-bit 
scheme. The data is stored in a tag using a particular 
binary encoding. This encoding is a public document 
published by EPC global. 
2.2. Security properties and existing work 
 Wong and Raphael identified five RFID security 
properties important for RFID adoption as stated in Fig 
2. [3] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Major Security Issues of RFID 
Extensive research has been done to provide privacy 
using authenticity, availability and anonymity on tag 
data. We have investigated some authentication protocol 
to check its usefulness on tag data tampering and 
confidentiality. 
Henrici et al.[4], Su-Mi Lee et al.[5] and Ray et al. 
[6] established mutual authentication schemes between 
the backend and the tag. In Henrici et al.’s[4] protocol 
Header EPC 
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Object Class 
(OC) 
Serial 
Number 
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share secret ID between the back-end and the tag, gets 
updated upon successful identification but this protocol 
has a database desynchronization problem. In a 
desynchronization situation the tag can be easily traced. 
In [5], authors have proposed secret shared information 
based authentication does not have this 
desynchronization problem but it can be 
cryptographically weak against tampering with the tag 
since the ID is fixed. In [6], authors have mitigated 
desynchronised problem storing old ID in the database. 
In this scheme hashed ID is not continually identical 
and the ID is updated after each successful security 
check. As a result an attacker cannot trace the tag and/or 
any previous event of tag respectively. However, it is 
not authenticated reader which makes it weak on rogue 
reader’s attack. Ray et al. suggested a protocol that has 
protection from desynchronised attack, change tag ID in 
each authentication and authenticated reader before 
transmission. It has stored authentic readers unique ID 
in database and used it to verify readers prior sending 
sensitive information.  Abawajy proposes a tag 
authentication scheme called TagAuth which is used to 
prevent tag cloning. [7] This authentication mechanism 
relies on the high security and computation at the back-
end side and allows for less computation in the tag 
itself. However, it did not address confidentiality and 
integrity property of tag data. Juels et al. discuss a hash 
based Access Control Protocol (ACP). [8] Here the tag 
is first in a locked state. When the tag moves to the 
unlocked state the reader can access the tag’s details. 
However, this ACP is not providing full confidentially 
as in its unlocked state an individual can see the entire 
information of the tag in plain text. Social engineering 
and insider attack is possible by those accessing the 
data.  
None of the above mentioned authentication 
protocol addressing confidentiality of EM and OC. 
These protocols are focused on privacy on the basis of 
protecting ID of the tag. However EM and OC can 
reveal same or more information to breach privacy and 
confidentiality of users. In addition, scientists have 
proved authentication protocols are not making tags 
tamper resistance. These protocols are vulnerable to 
attacks based on tampering. [3] 
Availability is a research area addressed address by 
most of the security protocols such as preventing DoS 
(Denial of Service) attack, protection from de-
synchronization attacked. 
Yet now, very little focus has been given to ensure 
confidentiality and integrity of tag data. Confidentiality 
of tag data is to ensure that intruders accruing data by 
interception and/or tampering cannot be used to do 
meaning full traffic analysis. Public parts of EPC tags 
such as EM and OC can be used to draw useful 
information to find the nature of the business and object 
class involved in it. 
Data tampering refers to attacks related unauthorized 
modifications and/or copying of data. Data tamping 
mainly cover following actions: 
• Data impairing: changing of some useful bits of tag 
data in order to damage it which makes it 
unreadable too. 
• Misleading data: data are altered, deleted, replaced, 
etc to represent incorrect object which mislead the 
entire business process and increase distrust. 
 
We can categories existing solutions in two 
categories as below: 
 
• Tamper evidence and restoring: Techniques to 
detect the existence of tampering 
• Tamper resistance: The ability to resist tampering. 
 
Challenge response authentication [9], lockable or 
password protected memory and access control based 
protocol [10, 8] stenography based approaches [11] are 
fall on temper resistance category. On the other hand, 
watermarking approaches [13,18,19], write 
activity[15],stenography[11] fall on tamper evident and 
restoring category. The temper detection and restoring 
protocols can be further classified as protocols 
achieving temper detection only such as 
[12],[13],[14],[15] and protocols achieving both temper 
detection and recovery such as [11]. This point forward 
we will only discuss protocols on tamper evidence and 
restoring categories. 
In [12], authors have proposed a tamper detecting 
technique using watermarking. It has generated an 8 bits 
watermark and embedded it in serial. The paper has 
used secret function to generate watermark using EM 
and OC of the tag. The authors have mentioned that 
short length of the watermark could affect the 
robustness of the tamper detection system. The main 
drawback of this system is that it is based on a secret 
function. Therefore, if an intruder or an opponent obtain 
the function, a huge modification of the system is 
required. In [14], which is an extended version of [13], 
authors have proposed a watermarking tamper detection 
algorithm. It used memory reserve for kill password to 
store watermark. However, note that many tag 
categories do not have kill password memory reserve. In 
addition, this might also create operation conflict. 
In [14], authors have used OC and serial number to 
embed watermark in [14]. In [14], author has introduced 
chaotic mapping to determine embedding location of 
watermark. An intruder can easily find the OC without 
watermark as it is public part of the tag. The OC value 
without watermark can be used to find the watermark 
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embedded on OC as long as embedding function is 
public. It cannot restore tampered data of the tag. 
Mohan et al. [11] proposed a tampered tag’s data 
recovery and restoring scheme based on stenography. In 
this scheme authors have select a group of tags serial to 
store the secret pattern. The robustness of the scheme 
based on the secrecy of the location of the secret 
information. However, this information shall be shared 
by all the entities that are involved in the trade of tagged 
products. It also did not consider the risk of tag’s serial 
number tampering. Yamamoto et al,[15] proposed a 
tamper detection solution based on a technique known 
as digitally signed journal bit it requires modification in 
the existing EPC tags specification. 
This concludes the survey of the most relevant 
literature on RFID security. We have seen that existing 
literature have failed to address tampering issue entirely 
for all parts of tag data. Existing solutions has many 
drawback in terms of security and applicability with 
existing highly deployed EPC tag formats 
3. Problem Description 
Most of the attacker works for an economic motive. 
Keeping EPC manager and object class in clear text will 
raise the possibility that an intruder might match various 
tags EM and OC. An intruder might use those data to do 
data mining and find out which delivery is for which 
organization and which product type is in the delivery? 
Confidentiality of tag data on the tag is essential to 
ensure secure operation of business. An intruder can use 
EM, OC to find out about the organization and the 
product associated with the organization. An intruder 
can use this information by combining with other 
available information such as shipment details to take 
competitive advantage, organization ransom and illegal 
use of user’s preferences. By capturing suffecient 
transations and comparing them with others, an intruder 
or insider might reveal information about consignment 
and sell to people such as robbers, business competitors. 
Intruder might link EM and OC of different  tags to find 
out organization’s name, product type and probable 
shipment size. This is done using linkability property as 
same oraganization and same product type have same 
EM and OC. Object class can be used to reveal product 
type which is a breach of individual’s privacy and cab 
be used for ill activities. An inside attacker can have 
more privilege to do harm, if tag information is open 
and easy to read.  
Data tampering is also a key concern. For an 
example let’s consider retail supply chain where 
multiple parties do business in a virtual collaborative 
environment by capitalizing trust of various parties and 
reliability of the systems information delivery. RFID 
system mostly relies on authenticity of information 
based on tag’s serial or identification number. However, 
if the information is tampered for other fields such as 
EPC manager, Object Class, it might destroy reputation 
of a business. Same time tampered object class can put 
individual’s social reputation in danger. For example, 
one politician ordered a t-shirt and during delivery 
object class is tampered with an illegal drug’s OC. 
Revealing this information to public can ruin the career 
of that politician. Data tampeing can hinder main 
objective of the tag which is correctly identification of 
the object. To tackle tamper related attcks, tamper 
detection and recovery is a must requirment for wide 
adaption of RFID system in suppy chain and other 
similar industries.  
After conduct a detail literature survey of RFID 
solutions we have identify that no one has presented a 
solution which protect security properties such as 
confidentiality, linkability resistance of EM and OC, 
tamper detection and tampered data recovery together. 
This gives us the rational to present our solution based 
on the principle of stenography (Stenocipher) to provide 
confidentiality and linkability for tag data such as EM 
and OC. A new embedding technique is used to embed 
watermark to provide integrity, in other words tamper 
detection and tampered data recover for tag’s EM, OC 
and serial number. 
4. Proposed Scheme 
In this section, we state general overview, foundation, 
and design decisions of the scheme. It is followed by 
theoretical foundation, mathematical explanation and 
example of three stages of the scheme: generate 
stenocipher code, serial number preparation with EM, 
OC and serial code finally date tampering detection and 
recovery. 
4.1.  General overview 
The proposed algorithm offers a solution to provide 
confidentiality and integrity of tag data. This will 
discourage intruders and inside attackers. Firstly, it will 
create stenocipher for EM and OC. Then the system will 
randomize the stenocipher of EM and OC to provide 
linkability resistance. Tag will have this randomize 
stenocipher (CCr) loaded instead of EPC manager and 
object class during manufacturing.  Particular 
organization will buy tags from manufacturer and 
generate the tag serial (S1). The system will then xor the 
stenocipher of EM and OC. It will then xor the product 
from xored EM and OC value with serial number. 
Finally, the system will hash the final xord value as 
stated in eq (1) in Figure 3. Furthermore to detect, 
recover and restoring data tampering in tag’s serial, 
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each tag serial will have a code(Scode) embedded in it. 
To detect data tampering on EM and/or OC, we will use 
reverse process of our scheme to find out the code and 
compare with stored backend data.      To recover those 
tampered data we will use stored backend data and 
serial code. The serial code of next tag in the tag set will 
help us to recover tampered serial code. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.3. EM and OC embedding process 
4.2. Foundation of the scheme 
The proposed framework can be decomposed in three 
different stages: 
 
Stage one – In this stage, system will generate 
stenocipher code for EM and OC. Then randomize the 
stenocipher(CCr). Write in the tag CCr of OC and EM. 
At the end tag leaves manufacturer’s office. Detail of 
this stage is on sub section 4.4 
 
Stage two – In this stage, system will generate serial 
code and prepare serial number. Serial number will be 
prepared using eq(1) to add EM and OC to it. It then 
embed the secret code in it. Finallly, write the serial into 
the tag which is capable to detect tampering and recover 
tampered EM, OC and serial. Detail of this stage is on 
sub section 4.5. 
 
Stage three – Tamper detection and data recovery 
stage. Detail of this stage is on sub section 4.6. 
4.3. Design decisions of proposed scheme 
In order to address confidentiality, linkability resistance 
and tampering issues, the following requirements need 
to be met by the system: 
 
(a) Stenocipher processed output should produce same 
length as input for EPC manager and Object Class. 
(b) Stenocipher has to be generated in tag 
manufacturing time as organization cannot rewrite 
EPC manager and Object Class in tag. The 
manufacturer should write the randomize 
Stenocipher code in the tag and handover the real 
EPC manager and Object Class to the organization. 
(c) The system should possess EM, OC and serial 
number to identify a tag’s real EM and OC. 
(d) Plain EM and OC should be stored in backend 
database for data verification and authentication. 
(e) The Stenocipher code should be xored and hashed 
with the serial number. It has to be done in the 
organization which is using the tag. 
(f) Backend database will store a random number 
r=rand (nEM or nOC) which is mapped with their 
specific EM and OC. 
(g) A tag set must have a sequential pattern where each 
tag has a sequence number as shown below: 
 
€ ={tag1,tag2,tag3,tag4….tagn}  
where  tag1=123456710, tag2=123456810, 
tag3=123456910………. Tagn = (123456710 + number 
of tags) 
 
(h) Proposed system should support plug and play into 
a middleware system. 
4.4. Stenocipher solution – Stage one 
The detail of stenocipher generation process is shown in 
Table 1. In Table 1 we have explained the mathematical 
foundation of calculating stenocipher.  Eq. (2) shows 
that firstly, the system will find next least prime number 
of the data block. It will then use Eq. (3) and (4) to find 
CCxy which is the building block of our stenocipher.  
Table 1: Mathematical algorithm of stenocipher code 
Inputs Plaintext EM and OC 
Outputs Stenocipher code and randomize 
Stenocipher code of EM and OC.  
xy=xy𝕡 +y'  …………………………….(2) 
where xy𝕡 = next least prime number of xy, y' = (xy- 
xy𝕡 ) and (2<x+y).  
 
if (length(EM or OC))/2  =0)  
        main: 
        if  x𝕡'+ y' >10 then 
            10101* (xy𝕡|| y')  =(( xy𝕡+1) || CCxy|| y')..(3) 
        elseif  2≤ x𝕡'+ y' <10 then 
            10101* (x𝕡|| y')  =( xy𝕡  || CCxy || y') .(4) 
        else: 
            CCxy=xy||xy 
else: 
      pad= (x2+2||2) 
      length(((EM or OC)||pad))/2)=0;  
      go to main; 
Processed EM 
code 28 bits (MS) 
Processed OC 
code 24 bits (OS) 
h(S⨁( MS⨁ OS ))= serial  …………..(1) 
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end. 
 
Where CCxy = cipher code of xy, x𝕡' = first number 
of xy𝕡   ,   pad   =   an   extra   value   added   to   increase    appropriate   length   of   the   data,   x2 = right most 
unpaired value of EM or OC 
 
 
The algorithm will process ab, x1y1, a1 b1 pairs using 
exactly similar process of xy pair. Finally, 
CC =(CCxy ⨁  CCab) || (CCx1 y1 ⨁ CCa1 b1) ……..(5) 
Reader can use backend information to recalculate 
the cipher and compare it to received one.  
 
CCr =CC⨁ r ……. (6) where r=PRF(EM or OC), 
PRF = pseudorandom function 
         
       We have developed this code by multiplying 10101 
with factored data derived from Eq. (2).The reason of 
using 10101 for multiplication is that it produces a 
sequential combination of data which shown in Eq. (3) 
and (4) in Table 1. Lastly, Eq. (5) use cipher code of 
each block and generate final cipher code (CC).To 
randomize the cipher code system generates a random 
number using PRF which uses EM or OC as function 
input. The system then uses Eq. (6) to generate CCr 
which ensures the linkability resistance of EM and OC. 
Then it writes the code (CCr) in the tag. This will ensure 
that even a same organizations EPC manager will have 
various different representations in the tag.  
Table 2: Transformation of EPC Manager 
EPC manager’s  hexa value Decimal 
54DD12C  8 8   9 8   5 9   0  0 
 x y   a b   x1y1  a1 b1 
 
Table 3: Stenocipher code generation for EM 
Calculation Stenocipher code 
 
Input EPC Manager: 
(54DD12C)16 = 
(88985900)10 
 
Step 3: 
 
CCEM =((3433 ⨁ 0807) 
|| (6363 ⨁ 0000)) 
     = 3662 || 6363 
     =3662636310  
       =22EDFBB16 
 
xy=88,  xy𝕡 = 83,  
y′ =(88-83)=5 
Spet 1: 
 
(10101*835) = 8434335  
 
using eq(3) and (4) we can 
derive CCxy =3433 
 
Step 2: 
 
Same way we can get CCab 
=0807 , CCx1y1 =6363 and 
CCa1 b1 = 0000 
 
Output: StenoCipher of 
EPC Manager (CCEM) 
=22EDFBB16 
=3662636310 
 
Output: Randomize 
StenoCipher of EPC 
Manager (CCr) 
=22EDFBB⨁PRF(EM
)                      
=22EDFBB16⨁7616 
=022edfc316       
As an example, Table 2 and 3 shows the conversion of   
EPC manager to stenocipher using proposed algorithm. 
EPC manager has 7(28bits in EPC-96) hexadecimal 
value. The system first converts the hexadecimal value 
to decimal value. Each pair of decimal value is 
considered as one block. Table 2 shows the 
transformation and pairing of EPC manager. Table 3 
shows the conversion of four blocks of data from plain 
text to stenocipher using mathematical algorithm shown 
in Table 1. Finally, we have stenocipher code 
‘22EDFBB’ for ‘54DD12C’.Another example is shown 
in Table 4 which shows the conversion of OC to 
stenocipher using proposed algorithm. 
Table 4: Stenocipher code generation for OC 
OC Decimal Intermediate 
data 
CC 
of OS 
CCr 
679A
88 
67897688 66463322(de
cimal) =  
3F6265A(He
xa) 
 
3F62
6516 
3f623
f 
 
The algorithm will ensure one to one mapping of EM 
and OC to a stenocipher code so that tag can be easilt 
identified even tag is storing randomized stenocipher in 
it. The code can be easily reversed using same principle 
used to generating cipher and tags serial. This scheme 
assumes that database has correct EM and OC number 
which mapped with their random numbers and it is 
accessible by the scheme. Correct EM and OC here 
works as the key. This will ensure confidentiality to 
ensure linkability resistance of EM and OC. Tags will 
only stores randomize stenocipher code of EM and OC. 
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4.5. Serial code generation and Serial number 
preparation – Stage two 
This stage details serial code generation and embedding 
process.  
 
 
Inputs Serial number, Stenocipher code of EM and 
OC and serial code. 
output Tamper proof RFID tag serial number. 
Step1: Prepare the serial code number to recover 
serial tampering: To detect tampering on serial 
number, we have developed a serial code (hexa sum) 
generating technique which will help to detect and 
recover data tampering. Eq. (7) shows detail process 
of serial code (Scode) generation. Each decimal 
number of the tag serial will be summed up to 
generate the code which will be xord with r to ensure 
randomness of the code. A detail of tag code 
generating process is shown in Figure 4.1. 
SCode=((d+e+f+g+h+i+j) ⨁ r) ………………. (7) 
Where “defghij” is the serial number of the tag and 
r=random number used with stenocipher of OC 
r=PRF(OC) 
 
Step 2: Prepare the serial number to detect 
tampering: In this step firstly we use Eq. (1) to 
prepare serial.  Secondly xor Scode with it to prepare 
final serial number for a tag. The process is shown 
below in Eq. (8) below. 
(serial1⨁Scoden)→(serial2 ⨁Scode1).... 
………..→(seialn⨁Scode(n-1) ……………………(8) 
Please note position of xoring depends on the 
sequence number of the serial in the set. A detail 
embedding position discovery process is shown in 
Table 5. Each tag will be embedding with a serial 
code value of its previous tag member of the set. An 
example calculation of this serial code generation is 
shown in Table 6. Table 6 uses SHA-256 hash 
algorithm and select only first 8 hexa values. This 
will make sure we can store the hash code in 
available 36 bits serial spaces of the tag. 
 
4.6. Tamper detection and data recovery – Stage 
three 
Inputs Serial number, Tampered stenocipher, 
Data from DB. 
Outputs Recover tampered EM and/or OC. Serial 
number recovery if tampered. 
 
Detection uses reverse process of embedding to find 
the correctness of watermark using backend secure 
data. If it mismatch then tampering has been detected. 
The algorithm is using S and backend database data 
to recover tampered data. The recovery process is 
detailed below with the help of Table 7, Table 8, Eq. 
9, Eq.10 and Eq.11. 
 
Table 7:  Tampered tag data 
Description Tag data 
Tampered(s1) tag C64FE97E 
Not tampered(s2) tag 046D40A6 
 
Suppose s1 is tampered. The system can detect it 
using backend database and Eq. (9) as shown below: 
h(s1 ⨁ ( MS ⨁ OS )) ≠ h(s1 DB ⨁ ( MS ⨁ OS ) DB ) 
and SCoden = SCoden DB ……………………………………..(9) 
Eq. (9) will be true if EM and/or OC are 
tampered. The system will re-write the EM and/or 
OC if it has access to it otherwise reject the tag all the 
time. In this step we are assuming that serial number 
is not tampered.  
h(s1 ⨁ ( MS ⨁ OS )) ≠ h(s1 DB ⨁ ( MS ⨁ OS ) DB ) 
and SCoden ≠ SCoden DB  ……………..(10) 
 
 
Eq. (10) will be true if serial of the tag is tampered. 
In this situation reader interrogates all tag 
members of the set in the area. It finds the missing 
sequence number among the existing authentic 
tags. It then asks the next tag of missing tag for the 
secret it has stored for tampered tag.  
((s2⨁(EM⨁OC))⨁SCode1) - (s2⨁(EM⨁OC)) = 
SCode1…………………………………… (11) 
The system uses Eq. (11) to reveal the Scode of 
tag1 and uses Table 8 below to recover the serial 
of tag1. 
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Table 8: Detection and recovery process 
Step 1: s1 – 0448288F Step 2: ask s2 – what is 
the secret key? 
Step 3: S2 return 
1C(serial code) = 28  
Present tag(s2)=29 
=1234568 ( this can be 
drawn from DB) 
Step 4: Finally, The s1 
must be 1234567 = 28 
Serial found! 
 
5. Comparative study and applicability test 
In this section, we have compared our protocol with 
existing similar one to present the betterment of our 
proposed scheme. We have also detail the suitability test 
of our scheme to present applicability of proposed 
protocol using existing hardware. 
5.1. Comparative study 
We have compared our proposed protocol with existing 
similar protocols [11], [12],[13],[14] and [15]. We have 
compared on the basis of security protection, 
compatibility and techniques used. Our analysis shows 
that our protocol has better security protection for tag’s 
data and for RFID systems. It can be adapted without 
any modification of existing hardware. In Table 9, we 
have presented the comparison of the proposed protocol 
with existing ones. In the comparison table: the symbol 
√ means protocol satisfies the titled description, the ∆ 
means partially satisfied, the X sign means, it does not 
satisfies the titled description.  
5.2. Applicability with existing readers and tag 
We have tested our prosed scheme with an EPC class 1 
gen 2 tag using ISC.MU.02 reader by using ISO start 
middleware version 09.00.01. FIGURE 4 and 5 shows 
the implementation result. Our scheme is completely 
suitable for existing EPC tags to provide confidentiality 
and integrity. The best part of this scheme is that we can 
deploy this scheme using existing RFID readers, 
middleware and tag which makes it very economic and 
reasonable. 
Figure 4 above shows EPC class 1 gen2 tag data in 
current industry standard. We have used ISC.MU.02 
UHF reader to write data shown in Figure 4. In Figure 
5, we have used our proposed randomize stenocipher 
data to store EM and OC. In addition we have stored 
serial number with SCode. The new data on tag is 
shown in Figure 5. It shows that proposed scheme is 
fully applicable to existing tags formats using 
conventional readers.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Tag Data before applying our scheme 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Tag data after we have transformed using our scheme 
6. Conclusion and Future Work 
In this paper we have proposed a stenographic technique 
to protect tags confidentiality. Little or no research of 
RFID arena has been done to ensure confidentiality, 
linkability resistance` of EM and OC for stopping 
outside and inside attackers. In addition we have also 
proposed a code embedding technique to recover EM, 
OC and serial number. Previous research on this arena 
has only able to recover EM and OC after tampering. 
Our proposed scheme can recover also serial number. 
This was the first phase of this scheme where we have 
established theoretical base and check its suitability on 
existing EPC tag format. In future, we are planning to 
test this technique against various attacks related to 
tampering and linkability. 
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Table 5: Embedding serial number with serial code 
Rules to find a embedding position: 
if n>tb then 
          if tb-pt =1 then  
start embedding SCode with first position of the successive tag. 
         else: 
start embedding the SCode in the position where position=pt 
 
Where , n= total set member, tb =total length of the tag serial and pt= present serial code embedded position 
 
Serial number after performing operation in Eq. (1) is “d1e1f1g1h1i1j1” and tb=7. 
Table 5: Embedding serial number with serial code(continued) 
d1(First digit pt=1) e1(second digit pt=2)  
 
.... 
 
 
i1(second to last pt=6) d1(First byte pt=1) 
Tag1’s serial code will 
be xored with “d1e1”. 
Tag2’s serial code 
will be xored with 
“e1f1”. 
Tag6’s serial code will be 
xored with “i1j1”. 
(tb-pt)=(7-6)=1 
Tag7’s serial code will 
be xored with “d1e1”. 
Table 6: Serial code generation and embedding process  
Label Values 
Sequence no. Tag 1 Tag 2 Last tag of the 
set(Tag n) 
Plain text serial in 
decimal 
123456710 123456810 129789910 
Calculation for tag 
serial generation 
h(S1 ⨁(EM⨁OC))  
=h(12D687⨁(22EDFBB⨁3F6265)) 
=h(12D687⨁0211bdde) 
=h(02036b59) 
= eb3ee97e16 
05ad40a616 d044935316 
Serial code 
generation 
  1+2+6+7+8+9+9=4510=2D16 = this is the 
SCode of tag n 
1+2+3+4+5+6+7=281
0=1C16 = this is the 
Scode of tag 1 
2C16 = this is the 
Scode of n-1 tag. 
Processed serial for 
writing to a tag. 
c63ee97e 16 046d40a616 etc 
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Table 9: Summary of comparative study  
Protocols Tamper 
evidence  
Restoring 
tampered 
data 
Linkability 
resistance for OM 
and OC 
Technique/s used Applicability 
with existing 
hardware  
Robustness 
Mohan et 
al. [11] 
√ √ X Stenography √ ∆ 
Potdar  et 
al. [12] 
√ X X watermarking ∆ ∆ 
Noman et 
al.  [13] 
√ X X Watermarking √ √ 
Noman et 
al.  [14] 
√ X X Watermarking ∆ ∆ 
Yamamoto  
et al. [15] 
√ X X Write activity X X 
Proposed 
protocol 
√ √ √ Hybrid(Watermarking 
and stenography) 
√ ∆ 
 
References 
1. Gandino, F, Montrucchio, B & Rebaudengo, M (2010). 
'Tampering in RFID: A Survey on Risks and Defenses', 
Mobile Networks and Applications, vol. 15, no. 4, pp. 
502-16. 
2. EPCglobal.http://www.epcglobalinc.org/standards/tds 
3. Dennis M.-L. Wong and Raphael C.-W. Phan(2006). 
RFID systems: Applications versus security & privacy 
implications, IDEA group, 2006. 
4. Dirk Henrici and Paul MÄuller, (2004). Hash-based 
enhancement of location privacy for radio-frequency 
identification devices using varying identifiers, IEEE 
International Workshop on Pervasive Com-puting and 
Communication Security- PerSec, pp.149-153. 
5. Su-Mi Lee, Young Ju Hwang, Dong Hoon Lee, and Jong 
In Lim, (2005). Efficient authentication for low-cost 
RFID systems, International Conference on Com-
putational Science and its Applications - ICCSA, pp. 
619-627. 
6. Ray, Chowdhury and Pham (2010). Mutual 
Authentication with Malware Protection for RFID 
System. Annual International Conference on Information 
Technology Security (ITS 2010). I-24 - I-29 
7. J. Abawajy. (2009). Enhancing RFID Tag Resistance 
against Cloning Attack, 3rd International Conference on 
Network and System Security, pp.18-23. 
8. Ari Juels, Ronald L. Rivest, and Michael Szydlo(2003). 
The blocker tag: Selective blocking of RFID tag for 
consumer privacy, 8th ACM conference of Computer and 
Communication Security, page 103-111 
9. MF3ICD21, MF3ICD41, MF3ICD81 (2009) MIFARE 
DESFire EV1 contactless multi-application IC. Product 
short data sheet. Rev. 02 
10. EPC radio-frequency identity protocols class-1 
generation-2 UHF RFID protocol for communications at 
860 MHz–960 MHz (2004) 
11. Mohan, M., et al.(2006) Recovering and restoring 
tampered RFID data using steganographic principles. in 
Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on 
Industrial Technology (ICIT06) 
12. Vidyasagar Potdar, Elizabeth Chang(2006). "Tamper 
Detection in RFID tags using Fragile Watermarking," To 
Appear in the Proceedings of the IEEE International 
Conference on Industrial Technology (ICIT06), Mumbai, 
INDIA. 
13. Noman, ANM, Curran, K & Lunney, T (2010). 'A 
Watermarking Based Tamper Detection Solution for 
RFID Tags', in Intelligent Information Hiding and 
Multimedia Signal Processing (IIH-MSP), 2010 Sixth 
International Conference on, pp. 98-101. 
14. Noman, KCaTLaANM (2011). 'Tamper Detection for 
Low Cost RFID Tags: Using Watermarking with Chaotic 
Mapping', International Journal of Engineering and 
Technology, vol. Volume 1 no. No. 1, p. 6. 
15. Yamamoto, A, Suzuki, S, Hada, H, Mitsugi, J, Teraoka, F 
& Nakamura, O (2008). 'A Tamper Detection Method for 
RFID Tag Data', in RFID, 2008 IEEE International 
Conference on, pp. 51-7. 
 
Published by Atlantis Press 
     Copyright: the authors 
                     88
